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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
KATHERINE KOULIS (GORAS),
Plaintiff-Appellant

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
Case No.

vs.

20205

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS,
INC.; CHEVRON USA, INC.;
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY dba
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Defendant-Respondents

STATEMENT OF ISSUESx
With all due respect to appellant, respondents contend
the issues herein are as follows:
1.

Was summary judgment properly based upon the

Statute of Limitations where appellant alleged fraud which
occurred in 1968 and failed to provide a legally cognizable
excuse for not filing suit until 1983.
2.

Was summary judgment properly based upon the

Statute of Limitations where appellant's alleged breach of

"""Respondents are all affiliated companies. For ease
of discussion herein, they will be collectively referred to as
"respondent."

Lease which occurred in 1968 and failed to file suit until 1983
and failed to provide a legally cognizable reason for such
failure.
It is respectfully submitted that those issues
denominated "2" and "4" as set forth in appellant's brief are
not issues herein.

With respect to appellant's denominated

issue "2", as will be explained hereinafter, the "alleged
breach" is irrelevant to this appeal and the ruling of the
court below.

The issue herein is not whether respondents

"breached," but rather was the lawsuit instituted seasonably.
With respect to issue number 4, for purposes of its
Motion for Summary Judgment the respondent conceded that
appellant did not actually discover the alleged delicts until
a date within three years of the filing of the complaint.

It

is contended however, that the determinative date is not, under
Utah law, the date of actual discovery, but rather the date
when appellant should reasonably have known of the facts
constituting the fraud.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant filed her original complaint on August 26,
1983.

Appellant alleged generally that respondent breached the

lease and its modification by failing to construct a service
station completely on the property of appellant; instead,
appellant alleged, such service station was constructed
partially on appellant's property and partially on adjacent
property belonging to a third party.
-2-

Subsequently, after respondent answered the complaint,
appellant with leave of Court filed an amended complaint. In
the amended complaint, sounding in both breach of lease and
fraud in the inducement, appellant again alleged that the
service station so constructed was not completely on
appellant's property.

It was also alleged that respondent

concealed its fraud from appellant.
On June 26, 1984 respondent filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment based upon the Statute of Limitations, as
contained in U.C.A. §§ 78-12-23(2) and 78-12-26(3).

Upon

hearing, the trial court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
judge presiding, did grant respondent's motion and issued its
order thereon on August 22, 1984.

(A true and correct copy of

said order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
taken from that order.

This appeal is

Both parties have sought summary

disposition of this appeal before this Supreme Court.

Such

summary disposition has been denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
The "facts" of this case are not complex.

The

"Respondent objects to appellant's statement of
facts as contained in appellant's brief in pages 2 through 6.
The "Appellants Facts" are totally violative of Rule 75(p)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that such "facts"
contain no citations to the record. The "facts" are nothing
more than argument and legal conclusions proferred by counsel
for appellant. It is respectfully suggested that for such a
purposeful violation of this Court's rules that the entirety of
the appellant's brief be stricken.

-3-

position of respondent in the court below was that when
appellant failed to file suit until fifteen years after the
alleged delicts, respondent was entitled to judgment based upon
the applicable statutes of limitation.

In support of

respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment in the trial court,
respondent proferred the following facts which were not
reasonably subject to dispute:
1.

On August 2, 1958 respondent, as lessee, entered

into a lease agreement (the "1958 Lease") with Pauline Koulis
(appellant's predecessor in interest), as lessor, concerning
the following-described premises (hereinafter referred to as
the "Koulis Property") in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah:
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Lot 4,
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence East 132.75 feet; thence North
74.75 feet; thence West 123.75 feet; thence South
74.75 feet, to the point of beginning.
The common address for the Koulis Property is Eighth West and
North Temple in Salt Lake City.

A true and correct copy of

said 1958 Lease is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and is hereby
incorporated by reference.

See also plaintiff-appellant's

Amended Complaint, U 1; defendant-respondent's Answer to
Amended Complaint, 11 1; defendant-respondent' s Exhibit 9 to the
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984.
2.

Respondent was unable to take possession of the

leased property because appellant's predecessor had leased the
same premises to a third party whose lease did not terminate
-4-

until 1967.

Prior to the time of respondents possession, the

property had on it a two story building.

The bottom floor

housed a drug store and the top floor was used as a residence
for the Koulis family.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

January 10, 1984, p. 10, 17.
3.

On or about May 16, 1967 Pauline Koulis entered

into a Modification of Lease (the "1967 Modification") with
respondent.

A true and correct copy of said 1967 Modification

is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and is hereby incorporated by
reference.

See also plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint,

H 1; defendant - respondentf s Answer to Amended Complaint, 11 1;
defendant-respondent *s Exhibit 10 to the Deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984.
4.

Pauline Koulis was the predecessor in interest of

appellant regarding the above 1958 Lease and 1967 Modification
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Lease"), and all
of Pauline Koulis1 right, title, and interest of every type and
nature in the Lease was distributed to, and vested in the name
of appellant.

See Amended Complaint, 11 2; Deposition of

Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, Exhibits 2, 3, 4.
Appellant and her now deceased husband (a predecessor in
interest) received payments from respondent from 1968 until at
least 1982 under the Lease.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis

dated June 15, 1984, pp. 58-59.
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5.

In 1958 appellant was aware that her mother-in-

law, Pauline Koulis, entered into the Lease with respondent for
the utilization of the above-described property as a Chevron
service station (hereinafter the "Chevron Station" or
"Station").

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10,

1984, p. 11. Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15,
1984, p. 57.
6.

Appellant lived in an apartment on the Koulis

Property, the property on which the Chevron Station now rests,
from the 1950's until April, 1967. Deposition of Katherine
Koulis dated January 10, 1984, pp. 9-11.

Deposition of

Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p. 65.
7.

In 1967 appellant moved from the Koulis Property

because the Chevron Station was being built on the Koulis
Property by respondent.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

January 10, 1984, pp. 10, 19.
8.

Pauline Koulis died on or about January 20, 1968,

in Salt Lake City.

See Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

January 10, 1984, p. 15; "Approval of First and Final Account,
Decree of Distribution and Discharge of Executors," dated July
10, 1968, p. 1, attached hereto at Exhibit "D" and also
appearing as respondent's Exhibit 8 to the deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984.
9.

Appellant was generally aware from 1967 through

1982 of the Lease between Pauline Koulis and the respondent.

-6-

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated Ji it le ] 5 , 1 984, pp

45,

47-48.
10.

Appellant was the executrix of the Estate of

Pauline Koulis in 1968 and was fully aware, as executrix, that
one of the assets of the estate was the Lease, and that
respondent, as lessee, paid approximately $350.00 per month as
rent for the Koulis Property.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis

dated January 10, 1984, p. 35; Deposition of Katherine Koulis
dated June 15, 1984, pp. 49-51.

See also "Approval of First

and Final Account, Decree and Distribution and Discharge of
Debtors, dated July 10, 1968, pp. 1, 3-4, which is
defendant-respondent f s Exhibit No. 8 to the Deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, and which is also
attached hereto as Exhibit "D."
11.

In 1968 the appellant and her husband, as

executrix and executor of the estate of Pauline Koulis, read
the "Approval of First and Final Account, Decree and
Distribution and Discharge of Debtors," dated July 10, 1968,
which document recited that (1) one of the assets of the estate
of Pauline Koulis was the Lease; (2) that the specific property
description of the Koulis Property on which the Chevron Station
now sits was subject to the Lease; and (3) that the monthly
payments would be $350.00 per month.

See Deposition of

Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 52, 55.
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See also

"Approval of First and Final Account, Decree and Distribution
and Discharge of Debtors, pp. 1-3, which is respondent's
Exhibit 8 to the Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15,
1984, and which is also attached hereto in Exhibit "D." The
said "Approval of First and Final Account" was filed at the
request of the appellant.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

June 15, 1984, p. 10.
12.

After leaving the Koulis Property, appellant

remained in Salt Lake City, residing at 2370 Bryan Avenue, Salt
Lake City, Utah until May of 1981.

Deposition of Katherine

Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 4-5.

The time to drive from

appellant's Bryan address to the Koulis Property was
approximately 15-20 minutes.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis

dated June 15, 1984, p. 4.
13.

The Chevron Station was fully erected and

completed sometime in 1968.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis

dated January 10, 1984, p. 28.
14.

Appellant, as executrix of the estate of Pauline

Koulis, did not attempt to obtain a copy of the 1958 Lease and
1967 Modification described above.

Furthermore, appellant

stated that there was no reason why she did not obtain a copy,
and that she never obtained a copy of said Lease as executrix
of Pauline Koulis' estate because it "[n]ever occurred to me at

-8-

the time." Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10,
1984, p. 35.
15.

Appellant saw the completed Chevron Station on

the Koulis Property at least once in 1968

Deposition of

Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p. 28. Appellant has
also generally admitted that she saw the Chevron Station after
it was "totally complete."

Id. at 16. Appellant stated she

passed the Koulis Property whenever she needed to go to Magna
or Saltair.
16.

Id. at 27.
Prior to and after 1967-1968, appellant was aware

of the boundary line between the Koulis Property and the
adjacent property to the north, the "Crowther Property."
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70;
Exhibit 6A to Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10,
1984.
17.

The Chevron Station was built on both the Koulis

Property and the adjoining Crowther Property.
73-74.

Id. at pp.

As indicated in the Affidavit of James W. Stewart,

dated June 25, 1984, and the certified warranty deed attached
to said Affidavit, the Crowther Property was deeded in 1967 to
Diana Amelia Child Martin.

As further indicated in:

(1) said

Affidavit and Exhibit 1 thereto; (2) the Affidavit of Rick
Gates dated June 25, 1984 and Exhibit 2 thereto; and (3) the
Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson dated June 25, 1984 and Exhibits
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thereto, the boundaries of the Crowther Property were identical
to the property now owned by Diana Amelia Child Martin.
18.

The Crowther Property, now owned by Diana Amelia

Child Martin, during the period that appellant lived on the
Koulis Property, consisted of a single family residence.

This

residence was razed and the ground subsequently paved to
accommodate the Chevron Station built by respondent.
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p. 66.
19.

The buildings comprising the Chevron Station are

located partially on the Koulis Property and also extend
approximately 24 feet onto the Crowther-Martin Property.
Twenty-four feet is approximately one-half of the width of the
3
Crowther-Martin Property . Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson
(Surveyor) dated June 25, 1984; See Title Report and Affidavit
of Rick Gates dated June 25, 1984, indicating appellant has a
common property line with Diana Martin.
20.

Appellant was aware in 1968 when she saw the

completed Chevron Station that the Crowther home was no longer
there.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, p.

66.
21.

In 1967 and 1968, approximately one-half of the

Chevron Station was built on the Koulis Property described in

The Crowther-Martin Property is rectangular in
shape. It is 74.75 feet long and 49 feet wide. Affidavits of
Lynn Peterson and Rick Gates.

»10-

the Lease.

At the same time approximately the other one-half

of the Chevron Station was built on the Crowther Property (now
Martin Property.)

See Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

January 10, 1984, Exhibit 1; Affidavit of R. Lynn Peterson
(Surveyor) dated June 25, 1984; See also Affidavit of Phyllis
Vetter dated June 26, 1984 and Certified Copy of plat map,
attached thereto as Exhibit 1.
22.

When appellant finally decided to ask respondent

to provide her with another copy of the Lease in 1982, the
respondent did so.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated

January 10, 1984, p. 32.
23.

Appellant did not notify respondent until on or

about January 4, 1983 of the alleged "breach" of the Lease,
i.e. that the Chevron Station was not built completely on the
Koulis Property in 1968 as allegedly specified in the Lease.
See "Notice of Breach of Lease," dated January 4, 1983,
attached hereto as Exhibit "E."

The alleged breach occurred in

1968, i.e. when construction on the Chevron Station was
completed.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10,

1984, p. 28.

Appellant did not bring an action based upon the

alleged breach until approximately August 26, 1983.
Complaint, p. 6.

See

Thus, this action was brought approximately

15 years after the alleged breach.
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These facts were the facts upon which respondent
contended that appellant unreasonably delayed in the bringing
of this action.

Recognizing the rule that a summary judgment

is improper if there is a genuine issue of fact yet to be
determined, respondent cannot ignore that portion of
appellant's brief denominated "Appellants Facts."
As has been previously pointed out there is no
citation to the record referred to by appellant.

Secondly,

most of the assertions are conclusions of law, not facts, and
are unsupported in this tribunal and were not supported by
factual averment in the court below.
Lastly, most of the statements are irrelevant.

In her

brief appellant continues to urge that when paragraphs 7 and 11
of the 1958 Lease are read together it is clear paragraph 7 is
void.

Further, it is argued that respondent's failure to build

the Chevron Station solely upon appellant's property destroyed
the mutuality of the Lease.

Again, it must be pointed out that

this case, in the present posture, does not deal with the
merits of appellant's lawsuit.

This appeal is solely concerned

with the fifteen year delay in filing suit.

Under these

circumstances, whether paragraph 7 of the Lease is void, or
whether the Lease lacks mutuality, does not aid this Court is
resolving the issues at bar.
Additionally, whether respondent: breached the Lease or
whether respondent was guilty of fraud are not at issue
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herein.

The sole question to be determined is whether the

lower Court was correct when it found:
ff

. . . that the Plaintiff had the opportunity of
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud and
was thereafter inactive and dilatory in commencing her
action. The Court finds that all of the facts
necessary for Plaintiff to have discovered the alleged
fraud and commenced this action were available to her
in 1968. The Court further finds that Plaintiff has
failed to come forward with any legally cognizable
reason to excuse her delayed discovery of the alleged
fraud.'1 Exhibit A attached hereto.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Respondent contends that there are two issues to be
determined herein:
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in determining

that the statute of limitations as contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-23(2) barred appellant's cause of action for breach of
contract, and
2.

Whether appellant's cause of action for fraud was

barred based on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)
requiring a fraud action to be instituted within three years of
when discovery of the facts constituting the action should
reasonably have been discovered.
It is respondent's position that the trial court was
correct in granting summary judgment against the appellant.
The facts as presented in the Court below conclusively

-13-

established that all of the facts that would put a reasonablyprudent person of ordinary intelligence on notice of possible
fraud were apparent in 1968. Appellant, however, through her
own inattention did not institute her action until 1983. Thus,
fifteen years elapsed between the time she should have been
aware of her cause, and the time she filed suit.

Under the

existing law of this state, her claims are now barred.
ARGUMENT
1.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER, BASED UPON THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, WHERE APPELLANT FAILED TO
INSTITUTE SUIT UNTIL FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER THE
ALLEGED BREACH OF LEASE

Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-23(2) provides that the
statute of limitations for an action based upon an instrument
in writing is six years.

Once it was established that the

alleged breach occurred in 1968 (the date the Chevron Station
was completed) it was clear that the cause of action for breach
of lease was barred.
The applicable case law establishes that appellant's
cause of action for the alleged breach of the Lease accrued at
the time that the alleged breach occurred.

M. H. Walker

Realty Co. v. American Surety Company of New York, 211 P. 998,
1008 (Utah 1922) ("These cases undoubtedly support the
contention that in an action to recover for the breach of a
contract the statute ordinarily begins to run when the breach
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occurs and not when the damage is ascertained").

See also

Shipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (cause
of action for breach of contract arises when the breach
occurs).

Stated differently and in general terms, a

plaintiff's cause of action accrues "at the time it becomes
remediable in the courts," O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355,
463 P.2d 799, 800 (1970), or "upon the happening of the last
event necessary to complete the cause of action."

Myers v.

McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
Under any of the formulations of the Utah Supreme
Court quoted above, appellant's cause of action for the alleged
breach of the Lease must have arisen no later than 1968, the
year that the Chevron Station was completed.

Any breach of the

Lease based upon the fact that the Chevron Station was not
constructed entirely upon the Koulis Property could not have
occurred at any time beyond 1968, for appellant admits that the
Chevron Station was entirely completed in 1968. Deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p.28.

Consequently,

appellant's failure to bring her action within six years from
the date on which the Chevron Station was completed renders her
claim time-barred under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-23(2).
1968.

The Chevron Station was fully constructed by

Therefore, appellant's cause of action for breach of the

Lease ran in 1974, and is now barred.

-15-

Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that an exception
does exist in the law of this state for "fraudulent
concealment" of a breach of lease, appellant failed to come
forward with any facts in the tribunal below which support such
a contention.

There are but two contentions by appellant

concerning "concealment."
The first contention is that respondent failed to tell
either appellant or her predecessors that the Chevron Station
was being built on two parcels of land.
have occurred in 1967 or 1968.

This failure would

The second contention is that

when respondent recorded the Martin lease in 1968 it only
recorded a "skeleton" lease thus making it more difficult for
appellant to learn of the Martin interest in the service
station.

As found by the court below, neither of these "facts"

could possibly relieve appellant of her duty of reasonable
inquiry.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held in some
instances that a plaintiff's proof of concealment or misleading
by the defendant constitutes an exception to the general bar of
the Statute of Limitations and precludes the defendant from
relying on the limitations argument (Myers v. McDonald, 635
P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)), appellant's mere allegation that she
was ignorant of her claim until October, 1982 is insufficient
under the law to toll the applicable statute of limitations.
Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 13

-16-

Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463 (1962) (holding that plaintifffs
claim for insurance death benefits which was not made until
thirty-three years after the death of the insured was barred by
§ 78-12-23, regardless of plaintiff's allegation that she was
not aware that the policy existed and that she was a
beneficiary under the policy.)

Once the respondent proved,

prima facie, a statute of limitations defense, appellant, in
the court below, was required to sustain the burden of showing
that a genuine triable issue of fact existed with respect to
the statute of limitations.

Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines

Development Company, 72 U. 137, 269 P. 147 (holding that if a
defendant foreign corporation sets up in its answer that
plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations,
plaintiff must in his reply state facts and circumstances
sufficient to toll the statute.)

Importantly, the appellant

states in her deposition that the only circumstance she alleges
was fraudulantly concealed from her or her predecessors in
interest, was that the Chevron Station was built partly on the
property of another.

Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated June

15, 1984, pp. 38-40.

Appellant has admitted she was unaware of

what the respondent did to conceal this fact.

Id. at 43.

It is not surprising that appellant has failed to
plead or discuss her argument of fraudulent concealment with
more particularity.

To do so would require her to plead and
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prove that respondent somehow concealed from her view the
whereabouts of the Chevron Station and/or prevented her from
reading the very terms of the Lease which she claims was
breached - - a Lease which was a significant asset of the estate
for which appellant served as executrix; a Lease appellant was
at least generally aware of as early as 1958, and the rights to
which she inherited from the original lessor, Pauline Koulis,
in 1968.

Simply to state the proof required is to expose the

absurdity of appellant's argument of fraudulent concealment.
There was no evidence brought forward by appellant even
suggesting that respondent in any way tried to prevent her from
obtaining a copy of the relevant Lease or in any way tried to
prevent her from observing where the Chevron Station was
constructed.

Appellant concedes that respondent gave her a

copy of the Lease as soon as she bothered to ask for one.
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, p.32.
Indeed, it would have been next to impossible, if not
impossible, for respondent to have tried to conceal the fact
that approximately one-half of the Chevron Station was not
constructed on the Koulis Property, because the appellant lived
on the Koulis Property from the 1950's through 1967 and was
familiar with property lines surrounding it. Deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70; Deposition of
Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984, pp. 24, 30-32.
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Finally, appellant cannot successfully plead and prove
fraudulent concealment in the instant case because the
undisputed facts, far from showing concealment, demonstrate as
a matter of law that appellant should have discovered the
existence of her cause of action through reasonable care and
inquiry.

This argument will be developed fully in that portion

of this brief dealing with application of the statute of
4
limitations to appellant's claim for fraud.
In Myers v. McDonald, supra, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah
1981), Justice Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the
important policy considerations supporting statutes of
limitations generally.

Quoting the United States Supreme

Court, Justice Oaks emphasized that statutes of limitations
"are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared."

Id. at 86.

Certainly these off-quoted policy considerations apply
to the present case and compel the conclusion that appellant's
actions should be barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellant claims that respondent breached a Lease entered into

It is submitted that the rules concerning delayed
discovery and reasonable inquiry are the same for contract
actions as they are for fraud actions.
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in 1958. Fifteen years have passed since 1968, the time of the
alleged breach.

During that time, not only have witnesses

forgotten the circumstances surrounding the terms of the Lease
and the building of the Chevron Station, but key witnesses with
respect to the terms of the Lease, Pauline Koulis and her son,
Paul Koulis, have died.
The present dispute is a prime example of a situation
where the statute of limitations should be applied to protect
respondent from the assertion of stale claims.
2.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY BASED UPON THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHERE THE FRAUD ALLEGED BY
APPELLANT OCCURRED IN 1968 AND SUIT WAS NOT
INSTITUTED UNTIL 1983 AND APPELLANT FAILED TO
PRESENT A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY

Under Utah law, actions based on allegations of fraud
or mistake are subject to a three year statute of limitations.
Section 78-12-26(3) of Utah Code states that a suit must be
brought within three years for M[a]n action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the fraud or mistake."
The Utah Supreme Court, however,, has qualified the
language of §78-12-26(3) by declaring that the three year
limitations period begins to run either from the time the
plaintiff discovers the fraud, or from the time the plaintiff
reasonably should have known of the fraud.
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McConkie v.

Hartman, supra, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) (holding plaintiff's
action time-barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) because
eight years had elapsed in which time reasonable inquiry by the
plaintiff would have put him on notice of the alleged mistake
or fraud); Gibson v. Jensen, 48 U. 244, 158 P. 426, 427
(1916) (one informed of such facts as will put a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received
information sufficient to start the running of the statute of
limitations); Larsen v. Utah Loan & Trust Co., 65 P. 208, 211
(Utah 1901) (the statute of limitations for fraud commences to
run upon discovery of the fraud, or of facts sufficient to put
an ordinarily intelligent person on inquiry); Taylor v. Moore,
51 P.2d 222, 228 (Utah 1935) ("A party who has opportunity of
knowing the facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be
inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose
by his own laches and negligence.")
In McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974) the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's application of
UCA § 78-12-26(3) to bar plaintiffs' claims for fraud, in spite
of plaintiffs' contention that there had been fraudulent
concealment.

The court refused to reform plaintiffs' warranty

deeds to strike out certain reservations of mineral rights
because plaintiffs had ample opportunity to discover any fraud
or mistake by familiarizing themselves with the language of the
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deeds.

The court was unsympathetic to the fact that plaintiffs

had not seen the deeds after their recordation.

At page 802

the court explained:
It is the plaintiffs' claim here as well as
in the court below that there was a fraudulent
concealment on the part of the defendants which
postponed the commencement of the running of the
statute pursuant to the provisions of Section
78-12-26(3) . . . .
The court below found that the plaintiffs
had full opportunity to discover the reservations
in the deeds when the deeds were delivered to
Security Title Company and when they reviewed
problems in the chain of title. That all of the
circumstances existing at or about the time the
deeds were recorded were such as to furnish full
opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery
of the mistake or fraud, if any existed. The
court further found that more than eight years
had elapsed since the time for reasonable inquiry
on the part the plaintiffs would have revealed
the mistake or fraud to the time of filing their
complaint.
In McConkie, plaintiffs' action was barred because of
their unreasonable failure for some 8 years to apprise
themselves of certain deed provisions.

In the present case,

appellant's action should likewise be barred because of her
unreasonable failure for some 15 years to apprise herself of
certain Lease provisions.
Both state and federal courts have not hesitated to
determine the due diligence issue as a miatter of law when, as
here, the circumstances clearly warranted it. Thus, the Utah
Supreme Court in Gibson v. Jensen, supra, 158 P. 426, 428
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(Utah 1916) reversed a lower court judgment for the plaintiff,
holding as a matter of law that "plaintiff possessed all the
information required by our statute respecting the alleged
fraud more than three years preceding the bringing of the
action."
In Heifer v. Hubert, 24 Cal. Rptr. 900 (District
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California 1962)
the court held that purchasers of a residence were barred from
bringing an action for fraud on grounds that the vendors had
falsely represented that the property had proper drainage,
because the action was brought more than three years after the
plaintiffs knew of the alleged fraud or had knowledge of facts
sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry.

The court held:

[W]hen the knowledge had by or imputed to
plaintiff is such as to compel the conclusion
that a prudent man would have suspected the
fraud, the court may determine as a matter of law
that there has been "discovery." Bainbridge v.
Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d, 423, 430, 106 P.2d 423; Lady
Washington C. Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486, 45
P. 809; Haley v. Santa Fe Imp. Co., 5 Cal.
App. 2d 415, 42 P.2d 1078.
24 Cal. Rptr. 900, 902 (emphasis added); Accord, Beresford v.
Horn 273 P.2d 302 (District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 3, California 1954) (summary judgment against
plaintiffs who had purchased and lived in a dwelling house
which failed in obvious particulars to meet the requirements of
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local building ordinances and who were unreasonable as a matter
of law in failing to discover the nonconformance during their
first thirteen months of occupancy); Wise v. Anderson, 359
S.W. 2d 876, 879 (Tex. 1962) (as a matter of law
plaintiff-lessor's action was barred by statute of limitations
because plaintiff had "knowledge of facts that would cause
reasonably prudent person to make inquiry which would lead to a
discovery of the fraud."); Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Curtis, 422
S.W. 2d 603, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) ("As a matter of law in
the light of their own testimony, appellees for more than two
years prior to the institution of their suit on October 1, 1965
had knowledge of such facts as would cause a reasonably prudent
person to make inquiry which would have led to a discovery of
the fraud.");

Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062,

1065 (Wyo. 1971) (granting summary judgment to defendant
corporation on grounds that plaintiff shareholders' fraud
action was barred by the statute of limitations; the corporate
books and records contained information which would have
apprised plaintiffs of the fraud if only plaintiffs had
exercised due diligence and checked the corporate records).
So, too, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin, in Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst 448 F. Supp. 84 (E.D.
Wisconsin 1978) affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor
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of the defendant as to plaintiff's claims of fraud under the
federal securities laws. Although the applicable statute of
limitations in that case was a provision from Wisconsin's Blue
Sky Laws, the court analogized to Wisconsin's statute of
limitations for general fraud actions which, like the Utah
statute at issue in the present case, provides that "the cause
of action in [a fraud] case is not deemed to have accrued until
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting
the fraud."

The court quoted with approval the following

language of a previous Wisconsin case, Koehler v. Haechler, 27
Wis.2d, 275, 278, 133 N.W.2d 730, 731 (1965):
Actual and complete knowledge of the fraud
on the part of the plaintiff is not necessary in
order to set the limitation period running.
"When the information brought home to the
aggrieved party is such as to indicate where the
facts constituting the fraud can be effectually
discovered on diligent inquiry, it is the duty of
such party to make the inquiry, and if he fails
to do so within a reasonable time, he is,
nevertheless, chargeable with notice of all facts
to which such inquiry might have lead." [0'Dell
v. Bumham, 61 Wis. 562, 21 N.W. 635 (1884)].
Commenting on the above passage, the court
stated in 1961: "Under the rule quoted above, it
is not necessary that a defrauded party have
knowledge of the ultimate fact of fraud. What is
required is that it be in possession of such
essential facts as will, if diligently
investigated, disclose the fraud. The burden of
diligent inquiry is upon the defrauded party as
soon as he has such information as indicates
where the facts constituting the fraud can be
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discovered." [Milwaukee Western Bank v.
Lienemann, 15 Wis. 2d 61, 112 N.W.2d 190 (1961)].
448 F. Supp. 84, 88.

Cahill is just one example among an

impressive number of federal fraud cases which were decided for
the defendant on summary judgment due to plaintiff's
unwarranted delay in bringing suit.

In all such cases, the

statute of limitations at issue (Section 13 of the Securities
Act of 1933) prescribed a period of "one year after the
discovery of the untrue statement or omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.

See Kramas v. Security Gas and Oil, Inc., 672

F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542
F.2d at 917 (reasonable diligence is tested by an objective
standard); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 1981-82 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. U 98,421 (D.Mass. 1981); First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Miami v. Mortgage Corporation of the South, 650
F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981) Militsky v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [CCH 1982 Transfer Binder] H
98,859 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Sleeper v. Kidder, Peabody and Co.,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1264, 1269 (D.Mass. 1979).
As the foregoing review of authorities readily
demonstrates, where limitations hinges on the exercise of
reasonable diligence by the plaintiff, the issue of his
diligence may be disposed of as a matter of law.
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This is only

proper, since statutes of limitation are statutes of repose,
and they require a plaintiff to act with specified promptness
when he is in possession of sufficient facts to be put on
inquiry of his potential claim.

The statutory period "[does]

not await [a plaintiff's] leisurely discovery of the full
details of the alleged scheme." Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993,
996 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted with approval in OfHara v. Kovens,
473 F. Supp. 1161, 1166 (D.Md. 1979), aff?d 625 F.2d 15 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
The present lawsuit was filed in August, 1983. To
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, appellant must not
have, or reasonably should not have, discovered the alleged
fraud before August, 1980.

Excerpts from appellant's

deposition and the general factual circumstances of this case
demonstrate she knew or should have known of the facts giving
rise to her complaint long before that date.

Appellant was the

executrix of the estate of Pauline Koulis, her predecessor in
interest to the Lease.

By her own admission, in 1968 she was

aware that the Lease was among the assets of the Estate of
Pauline Koulis.

Notwithstanding this knowledge, she failed to

acquaint herself with the terms of the 1958 Lease or 1967
Modification.

Appellant makes no allegation that respondent in

any way prevented her from discovering the terms of the Lease.

-27-

Most significantly, as early as 1968 appellant was
aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice of any breach of
the Lease due to the fact that the Chevron Station was not
constructed entirely upon the Koulis Property.

In this respect

the present case is similar to Taylor v. Moore, supra, 51
P.2d 222 (Utah 1935).

Taylor was a mortgage foreclosure suit

in which the defendant mortgagor argued for rescission of the
notes and mortgage on the ground that the vendor had
fraudulently misrepresented that the mortgaged property
included land upon which certain hotel and ranch buildings
stood and also that title to the land constituted ownership of
water supplied from a tank on adjoining property.

The Utah

Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the facts
were sufficient to give notice to mortgagor three years prior
to commencement of the action that the buildings were located
on property owned by a railroad, not on the mortgagor's
property, and that the water was also owned by the railroad.
These findings precluded rescission of the notes and mortgage.
The court explained:
If he had at the time he entered into the
contract of purchase been lulled into security by
the representation of Nephi M. Taylor respecting
ownership of a good water right, surely he was
then, in 1926, on notice of facts which he could
not further ignore. The physical facts speak
louder than any representation which Taylor could
have made, that the hotel was on railroad
property, and also that the water from the water
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tank was owned by the railroad company. Gibson
v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426. The means
of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A
party who has opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be
inactive and afterwards allege a want of
knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches
and negligence. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
Inv. Co., 43 Utah 181, 134 P. 603.
51 P.2d 222, 228-9 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar appellant admitted that at least
once during 1968 she personally observed the Chevron Station,
where it was built, and that the Chevron Station was entirely
completed.

Notwithstanding this admission, and notwithstanding

the fact that appellant prior to 1968 lived on the Koulis
Property for over ten years and was therefore familiar with its
boundaries, she now asserts that she did not realize that the
Chevron Station was constructed beyond the boundaries of the
Koulis Property until 1982.

Such an oversight is incredible,

and unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that the
Chevron Station exceeded the boundaries of the Koulis Property
to such an extent.

Nearly one-half of the Chevron Station was

constructed on property beyond the limits of the Koulis
Property onto the Crowther-Martin property.

Also, she admitted

she was aware of the common boundary between the Koulis
Property and the Crowther-Martin Property in 1967, which is
exactly the point in time that the Chevron Station was being
built.

The Crowther Property line is the precise property line
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over which the Chevron Station overlaps.

See Deposition of

Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 63-70; Exhibit 6A to
Deposition of Katherine Koulis dated January 10, 1984;
Appellant's husband and her mother-in-law, Pauline Koulis,
predecessors in interest under the Lease, also knew of the
Crowther Property line.

See Deposition of Katherine Koulis

dated June 15, 1984, p. 73.

The Chevron Station was built on

both the Koulis Property and the Crowther Property.

Deposition

of Katherine Koulis dated June 15, 1984, pp. 73-74.
Additionally, the evidence below was uncontradicted
that in order to construct the station, it was necessary to
raze the Crowther residence and pave both the Koulis Property
and the Crowther Property.

Thus, when in 1968 and thereafter,

appellant saw the Chevron Station, she would be charged with
the knowledge that the Crowther residence was missing.

This

fact alone placed a duty of reasonable inquiry upon appellant.
Why, if the Station was to be completely on her property, was
the Crowther Property now part of the paving for the Station,
and what happened to the Crowther house?
Neither the trial court or this tribunal are required
to wear blinders when confronted with statements which are
patently erroneous.

Common sense may not be abandoned in order

to find genuine triable issues of fact where none exist.
Appellant asserts (though not by affidavit or other competent
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evidence) that the encroachment of the Station onto the
Crowther property could not be ascertained except by a survey.
The trial court had no difficulty in dismissing, as without
merit, such assertion.
action.

The court below was correct in its

How could someone as familiar with the Koulis and

Crowther Properties as appellant not realize that all of the
Crowther Property was being utilized for service station
purposes?

The entirety of the Crowther Property was paved.

The Crowther house was gone.

One half of the Crowther property

has service station facilities on it.

To simply reiterate

these facts demonstrate the fallaciousness of the contention.
As stated in Taylor v. Moore 51 P.2d 222 at page 228:
The means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts
constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by
reason of his own laches and negligence.
Appellant had for fifteen years prior to instituting
this action, the means of knowledge.

She failed to read the

Lease and failed to become aware of the obvious.

She cannot

now be heard to complain that she did not know.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, it is
respectfully submitted that the judgment in this matter was
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correctly decided and it is urged that the judgment of the
trial court be affirmed in its entirety.
Respectfully Submitted
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

By:
Michael F. Richman
James W. Stewart
Attorneys for Respondents
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
2384R
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that I hand delivered four (4)
copies of the within brief (Respondents Brief) to:

Mark S. Miner
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
This

/^

day of May, 1985.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL I MCCARTHY
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
James W. Stewart, Esq.
Wayne D. Swan, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KATHERINE KOULIS (GORAS),
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs .
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS,
INC.; CHEVRON USA, INC.;
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY dba STANDARD
OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,

Civil No. C83-6295
(Judge Frederick)

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing on Defendants' written Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff's written Motion for Summary Judgment, before the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, on the 6th day
of August, 1984 at 10:00 a.m.

The Plaintiff was represented by

Mark S. Miner, Esq., and the Defendants were represented by
Michael F. Richman, Esq., James W. Stewart, Esq. and Wayne D.
Swan, Esq.

EXHIBIT A

Based upon the affidavits and exhibits submitted to
the Court and upon the oral argument of the respective counsel,
the Court finds that the Plaintiff had the opportunity of
knowing the facts consitiuting the alleged fraud and was
thereafter inactive and dilatory in commencing her action.

The

Court finds that all of the facts necessary for Plaintiff to
have discovered the alleged fraud and commenced this action
were available to her in 1968.

The Court further finds that

Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any legally
cognizable reason to excuse her delayed discovery of the
alleged fraud.
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants 1 Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.

Plaintiff's action is barred both by the

statute of limitations for actions upon a contract (Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26(2)) and by the statute of limitations
applicable to actions for fraud (Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-26(3)).
The Court's determination herein is not based on
Plaintiff's counsel's insertion of copies of the 1967 Grade
Plans for the Chevron Station as Exhibits to the Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Affidavit of Katherine Koulis, and the Affidavit of Mr. Cayias.
The Court having considered the written pleadings and
oral arguments of counsel for all parties concerning the above
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motions, the court being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1)

Defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment is

(2)

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied,

(3)

Defendants are awarded their costs herein.

granted;

DATED this

dav of/yyk^i-^Jy! I~984.
BY THE COURT:

". Dennis Frederick,
District Judge
Approved as to form:

Michael F. Richman
Attorney for Defendants

Mark S. Miner
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's
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Motion for Summary Judgment, this

/0

day of 4v-v'--Ti
J

1984, to the following:
Mark S. Miner, Esq.
Peter Flangas, Esq.
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
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L E A S E
Dated:

1.

August 2, 1958

PAULINE KCUL1S, Lessor, hereby leases to STAND-

ARD OIL COK?ANY OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC.,
Lessee, the folloving described premises in the City of Salt
Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to vie:
Commencing at the southwest corner of Lot Ut
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence east 123.75 feet, thence north
74.75 feet, thence vest 123.75 feet, thence
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning.
2.

The term of this lease shall commence on October

1, 195S, and end fifteen years after the first day of the

first

calendar month folloving the month during vhich a service station is completely constructed on the leased premises, and
all fixtures and equipment are installed thereon by Lessee.
Provided, however, that in no event shall said fifteen-year
period commence on a date later than June 1, 1959.
3.

Lessee agrees to pay Lessor rental for the use

and occupancy of the leased premises as follows:
(a)

An interim rental of Tvo Hundred Fifty Dollars

($250.00), payable in advance on the first day of each
and every calendar month commencing October 1, 1955,
and ending with the rental paid on the first day of the
calendar month preceding the commencement date of the
fifteen-year period provided in paragraph 2 hereof.
(b)

Thereafter, a regular rental in advance on

the first day of each and every month during said
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EXHIBIT B

fifteen-year period the sum <cf Three Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($350.00).

Provided, however, that no rental

shall be due and payable hereunder until the date on
which the leased premises are delivered to the lessee
free and clear of all leases, liens, and encumbrances,
except the lien of taxes and assessments for the current year.
4.

Lessee shall have the right to remove from the

leased premises all buildings and.improvements located thereon,
and shall be entitled to all salvable material, except two
sinks located in the upstair apartment.
5.

Lessee expects to commence construction of a

service station on the leased premises within thirty (30)
days after possession of the leased premises is delivered
to the Lessee as provided in paragraph 3, or after issuance
of all necessary permits and other authorizations, whichever
is later.

If Lessee shall be unable to obtain such permits

and authorizations, Lessee may terminate this lease by giving
Lessor ten days written notice of Lessee's intention so to do,
provided, however, Lessee shall not tear dowTi or remove any
buildings or improvements on the leased premises belonging
to the Lessor until the permits and authorizations referred
to in this paragraph are obtained.
6.

Lessee shall have the right during its occu-

pancy of the leased premises to use such premises for the
primary purpose of conducting thereon a service station business and for any other lawful business that will not materially interfere with said primary use.
-2-

Lessee shall further

have

*ight during its occupancy to construct and main-

tain on the leased premises such buildings, structures, improvements or equipment as Lessee may desire, and to cut
curbs, construct roadways and use sidewalks for vehicles to
pass to and from the leased premises.

Upon the expiration

of this lease, or any extension or renewal thereof, Lessee
agrees to replace all curbs and sidewalks cut or removed by
Lessee during the Lessee's occupancy of the premises.

If it

is or becomes unlawful for Lessee or anyone holding under
Lessee directly or indirectly, to conduct a service station
business, or to erect or maintain service station facilities
on the leased premises, or if any part of the leased premises
or the approaches thereto are condemned or changed by public
authority, so that in any such case enumerated above it becomes impossible or impracticable to use the leased premises
for service station purposes> then Lessee shall have the right
at any time thereafter to terminate this lease by giving Lessor
ten days notice in writing of such termination.
7.

Except as provided in paragraph 11 hereof,

Lessee shall have the right at any time during Lessee's
occupancy of the leased premises, or within a reasonable
time thereafter, to remove any and all buildings, improvements, fixtures and equipment owned or placed by Lessee,
Standard Oil Company of California, or the sublessees or
licensees of either, in, under or upon the leased premises,
or acquired by Lessee whether before or during the term
thereof, but Lessee shall not be obliged to do so.
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8,

Lessee shall pay all taxes levied or

assessed

during the term of this lease on any facilities located on
the leased premises while such facilities are owned by Lessee.
All other real or personal property taxes or assessments, including all street improvements or other special taxes or
assessments, shall be paid by Lessor.

If Lessor fails to

pay its share of taxes set forth in this paragraph promptly
when due, or fails to perform promptly any obligation cving
to a third person, which, if unperformed, might result in
termination of this lease, including any obligation to a
third person secured by a lien on the leased premises, Lessee
may pay such taxes or perform such obligation for the account
of Lessor and bill Lessor for the cost thereof, or deduct such
cost from rentals accruing under this lease.
9.

Lessee, while in possession, shall have the

prior right (1) to buy the whole or any part of the leased
premises or any larger parcel which includes the leased premises, if Lessor receives from a third party an acceptable
bona fide offer to buy, or if Lessor offers to sell, such
property, and (2) to lease the whole or any part of the
leased premises or any l^iger parcel which includes the
leased p"\':Lses, if Lessor receives from a third party an
acceptable bona fide offer, or if Lessor offers, to lease
such property for a term commencing on or after the expiration of the term hereof, or any extension thereof.

In either

such event, Lessor shall forthwith give Lessee written notice
of such offer, together with a copy thereof, and Lessee shall

-4-

have sixty days from the receipt of such notice to buy or to
lease such property, as the case may be, at the terms of such
offer, or at such lesser terras as Lessor and Lessee may agree
upon.

If Lessee fails to exercise such option within such

sixty days, Lessor shall have sixty days thereafter within
which to sell or to lease, as the case-may. be,—such, property
to the party and upon the terms stated in the notice to Lessee
without resubmitting such offer to Lessee as hereinabove
provided.

If Lessor sells such property to a third person,

such sale shall be cade subject to the terms and provisions
of this lease, including but without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the provisions of this paragraph.
10.

If Lessee shall hold over after the expiration

of the tens of this lease, or any extension thereof, such
tenancy shall be from month to month only and upon all the
terms, covenants and conditions hereof.
11.

Lessee may terminate this lease at anytime

after completion of construction of a service station thereon
by giving Lessor thirty days prior written notice of intention
<o to do.

Provided, however, Lessee executes and delivers to

the Lessor a bill of sale covering the service station building then located on the leased premises.

Lessee agrees that

the service station then on the leased premises shall be of
modern design and in good operating condition and state of
repair.

Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as re-

quiring the Lessee to give the Lessor a bill of sale covering
the service station building if the lease is terminated by

-5-

by the Lessee pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 5 c
u 'hereof.
12.

Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for all

taxes in excess of One Hundred Eighty Dollars ($180.00) per
year levied against the real estate covered by this lease.
Special assessments levied against such real estate shall
not be considered in determining such
13.

excess.

Lessee may extend this lease upon all of the

terms and provisions hereof for a further period of five
years by giving Lessor notice in writing of Lessee's intention so to do at any time prior to the expiration of the term
hereof.
14.

In the event Lessee exercises the option to

extend this lease as provided in paragraph 13, it shall have
the further option to extend this lease for a further period
of five years by giving Lessor notice in writing of Lessee's
intention so to do at any time prior to the expiration of the
term provided in paragraph 13. The extension provided for in
this paragraph shall be upon all of the terms and conditions
of the lease, except that the rental shall be reasonable in
view of business conditions then prevailing, but not less
than $375.00 per month% nor more than $^50.00 per moa —
15.

No failure to perform any condition or coven-

ant of this lease shall entitle Lessor to terminate this lease
unless said failure shall have continued for fifteen days
after notice in writing requiring the performance of such
condition or covenant shall have been given to Lessee.
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16.

All rentals payable hereunder shall be paid

to Pauline Koulis unless and until Lessor designates some
other party to receive rentals.
17.

Written notices to Lessor hereunder shall, un-

til further notice by Lessor, be addressed to Lessor at 2370
Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Written notices to Lessee hereunder shall, until
further notice by or on behalf of Lessee, be addressed to
Lessee at 164 South Vest Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
All notices shall be delivered personally or deposited in the United States Post Office, properly addressed
as aforesaid, postage fully prepaid, for delivery by registered mail.
18.

Execution of this lease by Lessor constitutes

an offer which shall not be deeded

accepted by Lessee until

Lessee has executed this lease and delivered a duplicate
original thereof to Lessor.
19.

The provisions of this lease shall inure to

the benefit of Lessee and of its principal, Standard Oil
Company of California.

This lease shall bind and also inure

to the benefit of the successors and assigns of Lessee, and
shall bind and inure to the benefit of the heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns of Lessor.

Lessee

may assign this lease or sublease the leased premises, or
any part thereof, provided that no such act on the part of
the Lessee shall operate to relieve it of any of its obliga-
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(LUIS

I ' l l l l r n l l i r r , dated the
*.* k :-

by and between

•of

2nd

day of

..^yJ-IS

_

AugUSt

19.58..

_

S a l t . .Lake.. C..tty.....y.t.ah,

_

hereinafter called "Lessor," and S T A N D A R D

,

OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN

OPERA-

T I O N S , INC., hereinafter called "Lessee,"
W I T N E S S E T H :
That for the term and upon the terms and conditions Kt forth in that certain written lease agreement, bearing date
AUgUflt...Z.,

19. J O . , from Lessor to Leasee, all of which terms and conditions arc hereby made a part

hereof, as fully and completely as if herein specifically set out in full, Lessor has leased, demised and let, and docs hereby
lease, demise ajid let, unto Leasee, the following described real property, situate, lying a-nd t*ing In the G t y of
Sal* .Lake
State or Territory of

_
.V.t.af\

County. Precinct or Island of

S a l t .lake.

_.._

more particularly described as follows, to-wit:

Commencing at the southwest corner of Lot 4,
Block 63, Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence east 123.75 feet, thence north
74.75 feet, the nee west 123.75 feet, thence
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning.

City and County of S.

Francisco)

19-'"/ before me pe
day o f t <
On this
sonally appeared H. D. Rasrr.ussen, to me personally known, who by me
being duly sworn did say that he Is attorney In fact of Standard Oil
Company of California, Western Operations, Inc., duly appointed under
Its Board 01 directors dated the 2C'c\>
Nov V * ~
resolution
1958, which said resolution is now in full force and effect, and that
the foregoing instrument was executed in the name and behalf of said
Standard Oil Company oT California, Western Operations, Inc., by said
H. D. Rasmussen as its attorney In fact, and said H. D. Rasmussen acknowledged said instrument to be the free act and deed of Standard Oil
Company of California, Western Operations, Inc.
. • ' " • - • "

.'.

" • ' * ' • ' * •

.'*••.

IN WITNESS' VKZREQF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
Official Seaiv/at myv.cfflce in the City and County of San Francisco,
the day anc] ye'^r^ iiv tb'Js certificate first above written.
Notary/Public in" and for the City anc County
of SarT Francisco, State of' Calif ornla
*/?
My commission expires
jp^r^7£r£5^££&£!I

(Other than Cali'JT
•and Hawaii)

0° t h i s / / ^ a y ° f August, 1958, p e r s o n a l l y appeared b e f o r e
n€ a Notary P u b l i c , PAULIKE KOULIS, - sigrj^r^of the f o r e g o i w ^ i n s cruicent, who duly acknowledged to ne t h ^ t ^ ^ ^ x e c u t e d t h e ^ * s * ^

Notary Public
Residing a t .S^lt Lake C i t y ,

Utah

My Cocrrission E x p i r e s :
C7—

^ = * 7

tr~l

"U

FEB 191959

u

^ J ,m.

Fee Paid. Ne'j£ M. Jack,
Recorder, Ssl^CTW County. UUh

'J.T'c"'~/o.

INDENTURE

<Pr.
LC^U.
Letsor

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC,
Lessee

~ATtvryi ryirrF JSTT~

Acknowledge here)

>TATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)

SB

On t h i s / f d a y o f A u g u s t , 1 9 5 8 , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a rred
*
before
a N o t a r y Pub 1 lib, PAULINE KOULIS , • s i g~n e C ^ o f t h e -f o r e 0g_o ii M
: ^ipstrui s e n t , v h o d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t o sae t h a t < ^ K V / e R e p u t e d t h e ^ a ? i e \

J^

^f^.

^L<7

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
Hy£~ozraLssion

Empires:

FEB 191959

at
Recorded
"-,-^
Request of a t M ^ X J - ^
Fee Paid NeU£ M. Jack,
Recorder, S^U-Cgg County. UtAh

m.

R.f. ^M-^^ffi^y^r,*.
INDENTURE

ui.

MODIFICATION OF LEASE
This Modification of Lease agreement, dated May 16,
1967, by and between PAULINE KOULIS , Lessor, and CHEVRON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation, doing business as STANDARD OIL COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA, successor in interest of STANDARD OIL COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN OPERATIONS, INC., Lessee,
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the sua of One Hundred Dollars
($100.00), paid to Lessor by Lessee, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in consideration of the mutual covenants of
the parties hereto, it is agreed that the Lease, dazed

August 2,

1958, wherein the Lessor leased to the Lessee the following
described premises in the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, to-wit:
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 4, 3lock 63,
Plat "C" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence
East 123.75 feet, thence North 74.75 feet, thence
West 123.75 feet, thence South 74.75 feet, to the
point of beginning,
shall be and the same is hereby modified as follows:
1.

The fifteen year tern provided for in paragraph 2

of the Lease shall commence on the date Lessee has completed
construction of the service station on the leased premises, but
not later than November 1, 1967, and shall end fifteen years
thereafter, but not later than October 31, 1982.
2.

The provisions of paragraph 12 of the Lease shall be

amended as follows:

EXHIBIT C

12.

Lessee agrees to pay the taxes levi^vl oi

assessed against the leased precises after the year 1967 and
during the remainder of the terra of the Lease.

Taxes for the

year 1967 are to be prorated as of June 1st.
3.

Lessee indennifies Lessor and agrees to hold her

harmless froa and against all claims, demands and causes of
action on account of personal injury to or death of any person
or on account of dacage or injury to property resulting froa
the use or occupancy of the leased precises or any of the acts
or conduct of the Lessee in the operation of its business upon
the said precises.
4.

The interic rental provided for in paragraph 3 (a)

of the Lease shall cogence as of June 1st, 1967, and end upon
cocpletion of construction of the service station on the leased
precises by Lessee, but not later than October 31, 1967.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
agreecent in triplicate.

mj/i tt*-H-1////:
•V • L - '

j.::.Cj±jL22t

LESSOR

CHEVRON OIL COMPANY
d / b / a STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

-

By^.

-'

cf.
LESSE:

STATE 6?~VTXX~
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

SS

a

On this r? fa day of
^ 1 9 6 7 , personally appeared
before me, a Notary Public, PAOLINE KOULIS, signer of the foregoing
instrument, vho acknowledged^to oe that•she*executed the saae.

'&&>^r^

Notary Public L
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My ^Coooission Expires:
-2-

1/

C/^S^^SSMi

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

SS

On this j2
day of Cjk/>£^ , 1967, personally appeared
before oe ^/s. r/. * Jss.~.*^ s?,/^
//
, who bejmg by ne duly sworn
did say that he is the /9^<^J^, ^>^^r ^JifJs,* s?£*»,sot CHEVRON
OIL COMPANY, doing business as STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
and that said ins truiaent was signed^in behalf of said corporation
by authority and said
\J^'. yy
A J^S^^-^^S^
acknowledged to
ne that the corporation executed the sane.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Cocsission Expires:

I/'
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iL^D iN CLEPJVO C.-rlCE
-:i.. L- rj Cc*j".y Utr.n
i . QULNYII: CANNON
A:tJrr.cy at Lav;
619 Continental Dank 31dg
Salt Lake City, Utah
32S-3?S9

JUL 101953
w .

:•:.-,

s^^sfe/f.". '2ZSl^^\

c

L\\">ct;' C:*.-:<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

; t a t e c: )

tne Matte:

APPROVAL OF FIRST AND FINAL
ACCOUNT, DECREE OF DISTRI3UTIGN A N D DISCHARGE OF EXECUTORS

)

PAULINE RADUuJ KCULI'

y f z 3D
)

Deceasec.

f

u^e

V ^ 'Il k'n-i"!
m o u l tis

Psvl-nr*
C w i

tors

^ate

a n c .\c.:p.ev:r;e \ c u i i s ,

Raculj K o u l i s , cecccScd, for Approval

.-.ceojnt, D e c r e e o f

r^I o Z

T> • c -r i b u t i o n ,

E x e c u t o r s h a v i n g cor.e on r e g u l a r l v

cnorec

3rd d a y of J u l y , 19 5 3 ,
appearing

befo

V £ ^ r>" • c*

execu-

" ^ (O

and D i s -

for h e a r i n g on the

- K

bove en. tit lee cot

ar.c i!

that the sale P a u l i n e R a d u l j K o u l i s , a l s o knov.-n as P a u l i n e

K o u l i s , w a s b e m or the 2-lth day

of J u l y , 1 8 9 0 , at E l a t e , P r o v i n c e

of Sac' C r o a t i a , ncv: Y u g o s l a v i a , and she v;as t h e v:idcu of the late
G e o r g e J. K o u l i s , and said P a u l i n e K o u l i s died on the 2Cth d a y cz
January,

1 9 c S , at Salt L a k e C i t y , C o u n t y oi: Salt L a k e , State of U t a h .

and at the civ.a of h e r d e a t h a n d f o r - a n y y e a r s p r i o r t h e r e t o she nai
an a c t u a l

and b o n a fide r e s : d e n : of Salt L a k e C o u n t y , State of U t a h ,

and left an e s t a t e

in said Salt L a k e C o u n t y , State of U t a h .

T h a t p e t i t i o n e r s , P a u l K o u l i s a n d K a t h e r i n e K o u l i s , were
duly a p p o i n t e d , q u a l i f i e d

and acted as e x e c u t o r s o f said e s t a t e ; and

sa?d e x e c u t o r s duly v. ace and filed v>ith the a b o v e e n t i t l e d c o u r t ^n
inventory
perty

of all p r o p e r t y

that said d w C t a s ^ d

possessed

and all Pro-

tr.«r s f e r r e d u'i chir. three y e a r s of their d e a t h s , a n d said

p r o p e r t i e s u : r c a p p r a i s e d by the c o u r t a p p r a i s e r s
SI 1, & 0 5 . 2 S an J ike St a t e T ax C o.ui s s i on a p p r a i s e r
,-rcxj; .;ric > in tin:- s u n of £ O S , 6 S J . ^ 5

EXHIBIT D

in the s u n of
appraised

s a i cJ

^nd there v;as an i n c r e a s e in

Thar said executors caused Notice to Creditors to be
published in the Salt Lake Times, said Notice to Creditors was
published in the manner and for the period of time required

by

lav; and thereafter the court made and entered its order decreeing
that cue and legal notice to creditors had been given and that the
time for presentation of claims had expired.
That no formal claims were filed v;ith said executors
as required by lav. and all claims against said estate, all expenses
of the last illness cf said deceased3

all funeral expenses have

been paid and satisfied and the State Inheritance Tax in the sum
of $529.40 has been paid in full; that a Federal and State Tax
return was filed v:ith the director of Internal Revenue and in that
said estate did net exceed $60,000.00, there was no federal
estate tax due and owing.
That en the 21st day cf December, 1967, said Pauline
Radulj Koulis made and executed her Last V:ill and Testament and
at said time she was not acting under any fraud, menace, duress, or
undue influence of any kind and was of sound mind and disposing
memory; and said Last Will and Testament was duly and

properly

admitted to probate as the Last Will and Testament of said

deceased.

That said Last Will and Testament of Pauline Radulj Koulis
deceased, provided:
"In the event m,y beloved son, Paul Koulis and his beloved
wife, Kathe irir.c: G. Koulis shall survive me, I hereby civise
and beoue^lh to thtv as joint to.vnts or to the survivor
in the event one shall predecta-: mo, all my property,
real, personal and mixed of which I may possess at the
time of my death of every kind, nature and description
wheresoever situated.M
That said Paul Koulis and his wife, Katherine G. Koulis,
•rvi >;e Pauline R^.culj Koulis and are acting as executors of said

-3estate and arc the sole beneficiaries under said Last V.'ill and
Testament.
That a.T.ong the assets of said estate are the following
pieces of real property in the County of Salt l a k e , State of Utah
to-wit:
nr* :
V-.-r-h . £r..pic , iuit L.aiw&
^ Li^nth
r,-P'^t v.'est
v
Corner of
anc
City, Utah, subject to lease to Stardard Cil Ccrpany of California for 15 years at $350.00 per
m o n t h , more particularly described as follov/s:

corner of Lot 4, Block 6 3 , Plat " C " , Salt
Lake City, Survey and running thence '..'est 2.5
South 74.7 5 feet to the point cf beginning.
:crner cf Lot 4,

tne boutn^v
v>^

«

' ~\

n i

^

Moll

^

T

^

T

I

<•* • _

c

'

i*o:f; c 3 , Plat
C , Salt La.-.c uity Survey, anc
running thence East 5 r o d s , thence North 74. 75
feet; thence south 74.75 feet, to the point of
beginning.
2370 Eryr.n A v e n u e , Salt Lake City, Utah .rore par tic;
described as follows:
East 15 feet of Lot 2 2 , and ail of Lot 2 3 , and
then L'est 20 feet of Lot 2 4 , Block 1, Wasatch
Heights.
That trie nares and addresses of said beneficiaries *.
nd Testarent and the nar«
saic i-as t i:: j _ a

:ciesses or a ^:

next of kin and heirs at l = -.;of said Pauline Radulj Koi

r> a-

Address

Paul Kodlis

2^70 Bryan Avenge
Salt Lake City, Utah

Kacharire C. Kcuiis
Daughter-in-lav

2270 L.y_.. A., :: ccSalt Lake City,
Vzch

C.cr 21

Dr..-c:-'r •>. iow-.lis
Adopted cv.uchlcr

2370 Ziy.:\
Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

January l-l

josie IM: .:J j s
Adopted dr.j^hLcu*

2370 b-i.yr.-i Avenue
Salt Lake Ci ly, Utah

Cctcbei 4,

Over 21

-4That said executors have computed av statutory fee and
and commission as provided by law in Section 75-11-25 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, for executors, which fee is in the sum of 51,316.54
and the fee for the attorney for said executors in the sum of $2,617.*
which fee is computed in accordance with the Advisory Handbook of the
Utah State Bar.
That said executors desire that said estate be distributed
as provided in said Last 'Jill and Testament of said Pauline Radulj
.NOUIIS, ceceasec,

tenants wno have r u n

?s:0 -:n-l:
vouiis anc \atnerme u. i^culis as i c m t
ngr.ts or survivorship.

NOV.", THEREFORE, IT IS KEFuEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AKD DECREE
1.

That the First and Final Account of the executors of

the estate of Pauline Radulj Koulis, deceased, be and the same is
hereby settled, allowed and approved.
2.

That in accordance with said Last V;ill and Testament

the following described properties are hereby distributed to Paul
Koulis and Katharine G. Koulis, his wife, as joint tenants and not
as

tenants in common with full rights of survivorship:
Corner of Eighth 'Jest and North Temple, Salt Lake
City, Utah, subject to lease to Standard Cil Company of California for 15 years at 5350.00 per
month, more particularly described as fellows:
Commencing 2.5 rods Uest from the Southeast
corner of Lot 4, Block 63, Plat "C", Salt
Lake City, Survey and running thence 'Jest 2.5
rods, Korth ?';.7 5 feet; East 2.5 rods; thence
South 74.75 fc-c.t to the point c: beginning.
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 4,
HloL-k 63, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence East 5 rods, thence Morth 74.75
feet; thence south 74.75 feet, to the point of
beginning.

-52370 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, irore particularly
described as follows:
Ess 15 feet of Lot 22, and all cf Lot 23, and
then West 20 teen of Let 24, Block 1, Wasatch
Heights.
all cash, all personal property of said estate

Lose-tner w

including the Pontiac Catalina, 1961 sedan, Serial 361 K 4042, 1967
Utah license CJ4S05 and all household furnishings and personal effects,
together v;ith all unknown property belonging to said estate which -".ay
be hereafter discovered.
or s m

tne sur/. or ^i } Jic . 3-

is allov;ed and approved and the clairr, of T. Quentin Cannon as attorney
for said executors, in the sue of $2,617.45 is allowed and approved.
4.

That said administration of said estate is closed and
:nat tnev nave

received trcir in tere s t and the same is filed with the clerk of the
above entitled court, and that said attorney's fees have been paic
in full, said e:;ecutor$ are discharged ircr.: further a'
civ.im strati on
M

s aic

:
estate of Pauline Rnculj Koulis, deceased.

r,

day

of July, I96S
EY THE COURT:

;.

•• 'ATTEST
J U D G E

S T * T £ OP U T A H
COCNTV c r J H T

LAKE

i
(

i:>

I T H E C ' S C e r s i C C O . C L E * * OP T H £ O i S T r t t C T
ZD'JPT OP J ' . L T L A K f COw'N'TV. U T A H DO H ' R I B V
;
- y n
" ' M i T T r . £ A N N E X E D A N D -.->"» CCr.'.C tS
• ":"*- ^ '-'•& 1'wuL CO^v OK »N O ' - i G N * L D O C U .
f N T o \ ' K i L ' i if: v v o r i f i c e * S S U C M C ' - C T . K

— ^^o,..f\.J^A._ „4>

c

.er;€'J this Notice on he w.^in nan

NOTICE OF BREACH OF LEASE

^ the J/Sih;

8 8 0 VEST NORTH TEMPLE,
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 8 4 1 1 6
KOULIS TO STANDARD O I L
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

19 JL^> 2 : >. :.i •-} , ^
•• . ! ,
" " ' W '""' ° " *

3v
Standard Oil Company of California
Western Operations Incorporated
fc Service Agent
C.T. Corporations Systems
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

WX7

01

^^ry^ZZl

"A

In Re: Lease 880 West North
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah
84116 — Koulis to Standard
Oil Company of California

The Standard Oil Company of California, Western Operations
Incorporated is hereby given NOTICE that on August 2, 1958 they
did enter into a lease agreement with Pauline Koulis; under
the terms and conditions of the said lease, the Standard Oil
Company of California did solemnly agree to build a service
station and maintain the service station facilities on the
property of Pauline Koulis.

That in direct violation of the

lease, Standard Oil Company of California did not build a
service station on Lessee's land as made and provided in the
lease agreement and by reason thereof they have violated the
lease in its entirety.
That as made and provided in paragraph fifteen (15) of
said lease, the Standard Oil Company of California, Western
Operations Incorporated is hereby given notice that said
corporation does have fifteen (15) days after receipt of this
notice to completely construct a service station on the lease
premises of Pauline Koulis and Kathrine Koulis, more particularly
described as follows:
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, commencing at the southwest corner of Lot 4, Block 63,
Plat C, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence east'123.75
EXHIBIT E

feet, thence north 74.75 feet, thence west 123.75 feet, thence
south 74.75 feet, to the point of beginning.
You are further given NOTICE that should you fail to comply
with the lease and completely construct a service station on
the lease premises, as made and provided in the August 2, 1958
lease also referred to in the modification of the lease, dated
June 26, 1967.

That the present Lessor, Mrs. Katherine Koulis,

will take appropriate action as is deemed to be required, to
require you to carry out the terms and conditions of said lease.
You will please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this 30th day of December,1982

MARK
Attorney for Lessors
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

PLEASE SERVE:

C.T. CORPORATIONS SYSTEMS
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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